主体博弈视角下政府购买公共服务财政监督机制研究  

Study of Financial Supervision Mechanism of Government Purchasing of Public Services.under the Perspective of Subject Game

作　　者：杨燕英[1] 刘栓虎 Yang Yanying;Liu Shuanhu

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学政府管理学院,北京100081 [2]天职国际会计师事务所,北京100044

出　　处：《政府管理评论》2022年第1期70-87,共18页Public Management Review

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“构建基于主体责任的政府向社会力量购买公共服务全过程监督机制研究”(17BZZ057)资助

摘　　要：政府购买公共服务制度是实现国家治理能力现代化的重要手段,涉及面广且与社会公众利益紧密相关。随着政府购买公共服务制度在我国的全面推开,由于缺少切实有效的财政监督机制,制度在运行中越来越多地暴露出各种问题和风险,需要各方高度关注。本文试图从理论上分析财政监督缺位下政府购买公共服务各方参与主体的行为动机与相应结果,论证财政监督可以通过改变激励约束有效制止各种博弈乱象,提出要在明确各主体责任的前提下构建有效的财政监督机制。As an important means to modermize China's capacity for governance,the system of government purchasing of public services involves many fields and is closely related to the interests of the general public.With the full implementation of the system,various problems and risks are increasingly exposed in the operation of the system due to the lack of an effective financial supervision mechanism,which requires high attention from all parties.This paper attempts to theoretically analyze the behavioral motivation and corresponding results of the subjects involved in the govermment purchasing of public services with the absence of financial supervision,demonstrate that financial supervision can effectively prevent various game chaos by changing the incentive constraints,and propose to build an effctive financial supervision mechanism under the premise of clarifying the responsibility of each subject.

关 键 词：政府购买公共服务 主体间博弈 财政监督机制 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学]