寻租、生产专用性投资与企业经营效率  

Rent Seeking,Production Specific Investment and the Efficiency of Enterprises

作　　者：黄晓光 李胜兰[1] 黎天元 HUANG Xiaoguang;LI Shenglan;LI Tianyuan(Department of Economics,Lingnan College,Sun Yat-Sen University,510275)

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院经济学系,510275

出　　处：《制度经济学研究》2020年第2期23-40,共18页Research on Institutional Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“环境政策工具对我国制造业绿色转型效率影响研究”(批准号:19BJY088)的资助

摘　　要：本文探讨了政府行政权力引致的管制与寻租对企业经营效率的影响。基于科斯定理和不完全契约理论,本文将传统的寻租理论扩展到了更一般的情形,不仅同时涵盖了传统的"有害论"和"有益论"观点,而且指明了两种观点之间相互转变的局限条件。本文研究发现:第一,在完全契约条件下,无论是企业通过改善生产经营效率获得市场上的租金,还是政府通过行政保护帮助企业获取租金并向企业寻租,结果是一样的,因为以租金最大化为目标的政府,在寻租过程中会向企业提出"寻租"条款,而这些条款,必然恰好就是企业在竞争条件下为获得最大市场收益所需满足的条款;第二,在不完全契约条件下,寻租则会导致较低的生产专用性投资,因成本降低而导致的产出增加量也会随之减少。因此,政府管制和寻租对市场是有消极作用还是积极作用,取决于政府是否难以掌握相关生产经营技术细节,以及行政权力是否导致了企业生产专用性投资的过度减少。基于这一研究发现,本文对中国当前"法治政府"建设和政府职能改革,提出了相关的政策建议。This paper discusses the influence of the government’s administrative power on the efficiency of enterprises.Based on Coase Theorem and incomplete contract theory,this paper extends the traditional rent-seeking theory to a more general form,not only covering the traditional"harmful"and"beneficial"views,but also pointing out the conditions of transformation between the two views.This paper finds that:first,under the condition of complete contract,whether the enterprise obtains the rent in the market by improving the efficiency of production and operation,or the government helps the enterprise to obtain the rent and seek the rent from the enterprise by political protection,the result is the same,because the government with the goal of maximizing the rent will put forward the clauses to the enterprise in the rent-seeking process,and these clauses must be exactly the enterprise has to be met to obtain the maximum income under the perfect competition;second,under the condition of incomplete contract,the rent-seeking behaviors will lead to lower the production specific investment and lower the increment of output due to the reduction of cost.Therefore,whether government regulation and rent-seeking behaviors would have a negative or positive effect on the market depends on whether the government which has relevant production technology and management methods can not grasp the rents,and whether administrative power leads to excessive reduction of production specific investment of enterprises.Based on the findings of this study,this paper puts forward relevant policy advices for the construction of law-based government and the reform of government functions in current China.

关 键 词：不完全契约 资产专用性 寻租理论 

分 类 号：F810.2[经济管理—财政学]