乡村旅游开发主体的利益博弈过程及其仿真分析  

The interest game process of rural tourism development entities and its simulation analysis

作　　者：赖启福[1] 李虎峰 李春硕 姜楠 林明水[3] Lai Qifu;Li Hufeng;Li Chunshuo;Jiang Nan;Lin Mingshui(College of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;College of Business Administration,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021,China;College of Cultural Tourism and Public Administration,Fujian Normal University,Fuzhou 350117,China)

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学经济与管理学院,福州350002 [2]华侨大学工商管理学院,泉州362021 [3]福建师范大学文化旅游与公共管理学院,福州350117

出　　处：《中国生态旅游》2024年第3期604-620,共17页Journal of Chinese Ecotourism

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BJY199)

摘　　要：开发主体在乡村旅游发展中发挥重要作用,但利益主体间诉求存在差异,并由此产生不同决策与行为,可能为乡村旅游可持续发展造成挑战。研究构建演化博弈模型,仿真分析基层政府、乡村精英和社区居民三方博弈,发现:(1)在乡村旅游开发决策过程中三方主体均呈现出追求利益最大化,同时降低自身成本投入的意图,可能导致开发策略的分歧。(2)在乡村旅游开发过程中,基层政府的决策主要受到奖励成本、治理收益和声誉损失等因素的影响,乡村精英的决策则主要受到开发项目的额外成本支出、乡村旅游项目带来的回报、投机行为的收益、损失等因素的影响,社区居民的参与决策主要取决于参与成本,高投入、低收益是削弱各主体乡村旅游开发积极性的核心因素。(3)开发初期,各种前期投入加大财政负担,降低基层政府积极支持乡村旅游的意愿,并导致乡村精英的投机行为;开发中后期,政策奖励门槛升高、项目同质化、收入减少,社区居民参与意愿有限,不愿配合,为获取投机收益,乡村精英可能会放弃努力开发乡村旅游项目的策略。研究通过分析各方行为的影响因素,提出乡村旅游不同阶段的策略调整建议,优化乡村旅游项目开发管理,促进可持续发展。Development entities play a significant role in rural tourism,but the divergent interests among stakeholders can lead to different decisions and behaviors,potentially challenging the sustainable development of rural tourism.This study constructs an evolutionary game model to simulate and analyze the tripartite game process among grassroots governments,rural elites,and community residents.The findings reveal that:(1)in the decision-making process of rural tourism development,all three parties demonstrate an intention of maximizing benefits while reducing their own cost inputs,which may result in strategic discrepancies.(2)During rural tourism development,grassroots governments decisions are primarily influenced by reward cost,governance benefit,and reputation loss.Rural elites’decisions are mainly affected by additional project cost,return from rural tourism projects,and benefit or loss from speculative behavior.Community residents’participation decisions primarily depend on participation cost.High input cost coupled with low return are identified as core factors diminishing the enthusiasm of all parties for rural tourism development.(3)In the initial stages of development,various preliminary investments increase fiscal burdens,reducing grassroots governments’willingness to actively support rural tourism and leading to speculative behavior of rural elites.In the middle and late stages of development,as policy reward thresholds increase,projects become homogenized,and income decreases,community residents’willingness to participate is limited.Consequently,rural elites may give up the strategy of developing rural tourism projects in favor of speculative benefits.By analyzing the influencing factors of each party’s behavior,this study proposes strategic adjustment recommendations for different stages of rural tourism,aiming to optimize rural tourism project development and management,and promote sustainable development.

关 键 词：乡村旅游 利益主体 利益机制 演化博弈 仿真分析 奖励成本 投机收益 

分 类 号：F323[经济管理—产业经济] F592F224.32