多个大股东对企业短贷长投的影响研究——基于监督效应和资源效应视角  

Research on the Impact of Multiple Major Shareholders on Short-term Loans and Long-term Investments of Enterprises——Based on the Perspective of Supervision Effect and Resource Effect

作　　者：刘洪彬[1] 赵运运 覃予[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《上海金融》2023年第12期34-45,共12页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：国家社科基金项目(23BSH025);浙江省自然科学基金项目(LY16G030025)

摘　　要：本文利用2007-2022年A股上市公司数据,实证检验多个大股东对企业短贷长投的影响。研究发现,多个大股东显著抑制了企业“短贷长投”,且主要通过发挥其监督效应和资源效应来实现;在民营企业样本组和成长性较高组,多个大股东的抑制作用更为明显,并且非控股大股东数量越多、持股比例越高,越能有效抑制企业短贷长投。研究结论不仅为多个大股东的治理后果提供了经验证据,也对如何约束企业短贷长投具有一定启示。Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022,this paper empirically tests the impact of multiple major shareholders on short-term loans and long-term investments.The study finds that multiple major shareholders inhibit the“short-term loan and long-term investment”of enterprises,which iss mainly achieved by exerting its supervision effect and resource effect.In the sample group of private enterprises and the high growth group,the inhibitory effect of multiple major shareholders is more obvious,and the more the number of non-controlling major shareholders and the higher the shareholding ratio,the more effective the inhibition of short-term loans and long-term investments.The research conclusion not only provides evidence for the governance consequences of multiple major shareholders,but also has enlightenment on how to restrict enterprises’short-term loans and long-term investments.

关 键 词：多个大股东 短贷长投 监督效应 资源效应 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275F271