土地债务治理、融资平台转型与地方商业银行风险  

Land Debt Governance,Transition of Financing Platforms and Local Commercial Bank Risk

作　　者：江笑云 宋尚彬 汪冲[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《上海金融》2023年第11期45-58,共14页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“中央管控地方建设用地的全要素生产率影响、机制与优化路径”(批准号:71973090)。

摘　　要：本文研究土地债务治理对融资平台转型和地方商业银行经营风险的影响。研究发现,土储债券显著激励了地方政府土地出让行为;对融资平台而言,土储债券发行没有造成融资平台偿债风险攀升;对地方商业银行而言,土储债券发行显著降低了地方商业银行的经营风险。融资平台筹资活动增加和地方政府充实其资本金有效补充了融资平台现金流,土储债券使融资平台可以获得新的收入形式和来源,营业收入显著增长,但经营“造血”能力还未得到显著改观。本文结论表明,破除土地金融模式,发行土储债券,没有造成融资平台风险扩散,地方商业银行经营风险得以显著降低,有利于守住不发生系统性风险的底线。In the context of central governance of local government debt,this paper studies the impact of land debt governance on the transition of financing platforms and the operational risks of local commercial banks.It is found that land reserve bonds significantly incentivize the land grants behavior of local governments.For the financing platform,the issuance of land reserve bonds did not cause the debt repayment risk of the financing platform to rise.For local commercial banks,the issuance of local reserve bonds significantly reduces the operational risk of local commercial banks.The increase in financing activities of financing platforms and the local government′s replenishment of its capital effectively supplemented the cash flow of financing platforms.Local reserve bonds enabled financing platforms to obtain new forms and sources of income,and the operating income increased significantly,but the operating“hematopoietic”ability has not been significantly improved.The conclusion of this paper shows that breaking the land finance model and issuing land reserve bonds does not cause the risk spread of financing platforms,and local commercial banks can significantly reduce the operating risk and hold the bottom line of no systemic risk.

关 键 词：土地储备专项债券 融资平台转型 银行风险 偿债风险 债务治理 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学]