实在论的多副面孔——对《逻辑哲学论》的寂静主义解读  

The Multiple Faces of Realism:On the Quietist Interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

作　　者：陈常燊 CHEN Changshen

机构地区：[1]山西大学哲学社会学学院,太原030006

出　　处：《国外社会科学前沿》2020年第4期13-21,83,共10页JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

摘　　要：在主流的"标准解读"中,实在论与反实在论之别构成了维特根斯坦前后期哲学的分水岭。问题在于,不管是实在论还是反实在论,都假定有意义的形而上学争论是可能的。然而,以赖特、麦克道尔为代表的第三种解读进路,即"维特根斯坦式寂静主义",直指任何有意义的形而上学论辩都是不可能的。从这种"非形而上学"观点看,《逻辑哲学论》在实在论色谱中的位置显得非常晦暗不明,不管是逻辑实在论还是语义学建构主义,不管是"非还原的实在论"还是"作为唯我论的实在论",都无法支撑《逻辑哲学论》的实在论解读。此外,从维特根斯坦后期观点看,《逻辑哲学论》中的"非实在论"的不彻底性是难以掩盖的。According to the“standard interpretation”,the difference between early and late Wittgenstein lies in the contradiction between realism and anti-realism.However,both realism and anti-realism assume that meaningful metaphysical debates are possible,but the third interpretation approach represented by Crispin Wright and John McDowell,namely“Wittgensteinian quietism”,which maintains that it is impossible to engage in any meaningful metaphysical debate.From this“non metaphysical”point of view,the position of Tractatus in the spectrum of realism seems very obscure.Whether it is logical realism or semantic constructivism,whether it is“irreducible realism”or“the realism as solipsism”,it cannot support the realism interpretation on Tractatus;additionally,from late Wittgenstein’s point of view,the“non-realism”in Tractatus is incomplete.

关 键 词：实在论 反实在论 非实在论 寂静主义 维特根斯坦 

分 类 号：B81-06[哲学宗教—逻辑学]