人工智能作为刑事责任主体:基于刑法哲学的证立  

Artificial Intelligence as the Subject of Criminal Responsibility: A Justification Based on the Philosophy of Criminal Law

作　　者：江溯[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院

出　　处：《法制与社会发展》2021年第3期111-127,共17页Law and Social Development

摘　　要：关于是否应当承认人工智能的刑事责任主体地位的问题,存在肯定说与否定说两种针锋相对的观点。立足于本体论的人工智能法律人格否定论存在严重的缺陷。从社会认可的角度看,我们完全可能承认人工智能的法律人格。从刑法上的行为理论来看,应当认为具备足够决策能力的人工智能可以实施刑法意义上的行为。现代罪责理论由于逐渐开始排斥"自由意志"这样的形而上学概念,因而完全可以容纳人工智能的罪责。在人工智能主体具备足够的理性能力的前提下,对其科处刑罚是有意义的,而且完全符合刑罚目的。There are two kinds of tit-for-tat views about whether artificial intelligence should be recognized as the subject of criminal responsibility.The theory of legal personality negation of artificial intelligence based on ontology has serious defects,and it is possible to recognize the legal personality of artificial intelligence from the point of view of social recognition.From the perspective of act theory in criminal law,it should be considered that artificial intelligence with sufficient decision-making ability can carry out act in the sense of criminal law.Modern culpability theory gradually began to exclude such metaphysical concepts as"free will",which can fully accommodate the responsibility of artificial intelligence.Under the premise that the subject of artificial intelligence has sufficient rational ability,it is meaningful to punish its subject,and it is fully in line with the purpose of punishment.

关 键 词：法律人格 行为 决策能力 刑罚目的 

分 类 号：D914[政治法律—刑法学]