自然主义—进化论与认知的可靠性兼容吗?——回应普兰丁格“反自然主义的进化论证”  

Is Naturalism-Evolution Compatible with Cognitive Reliability?A Reply to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

作　　者：德尼斯 Denisi(School of Philosophy,Wuhan University)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院

出　　处：《清华西方哲学研究》2022年第2期42-54,共13页Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy

摘　　要：自然主义的合理性是当代知识论学者普兰丁格所考察的重要问题之一,他提出“反自然主义的进化论证”以批判其合理性。该论证的基本立足点为:与进化论结合的自然主义不能与认知的可靠性兼容,即自然主义—进化论前提下我们的认知机能是可靠的这一论断的可能性较低。但这一立足点并不能成立。我们如果利用学者塞奇对两种可靠性概念的区分而将认知的可靠性限定为适应可靠性,就可以做到使自然主义—进化论与认知的可靠性兼容;且在引入格里菲斯和威尔金斯的米尔维安桥原则后,可靠的认知机能所产生的信念同时也是可接受的。由此我们可回应反自然主义的进化论证。The rationality of naturalism is one of the issues Alvin Plantinga,a scholar of contemporary epistemology,has focused on.To criticize its rationality,he has proposed an argument which is called Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism.The basic standpoint of the argument is that naturalism-evolution cannot be compatible with cognitive reliability,i.e.,the probability that our cognitive faculties is reliable given naturalism and evolution is low.But this standpoint is not sound.If we take into account Sage's distinction between two different cognitive reliability and confine cognitive reliability to fitness-reliability,there will be no such incompatibility;and after we introduce Griffiths and Wilkins's Principle of Milvian Bridge,the beliefs generated by reliable cognitive faculties will be acceptable as well.From this we can reply to Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.

关 键 词：普兰丁格 自然主义 反自然主义的进化论证 认知的可靠性 米尔维安桥原则 

分 类 号：Q-05[生物学] N0[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]