农业巨灾保险共保体模式中市场主体的博弈模型分析  

Game model on coinsurance of agricultural catastrophe insurance

作　　者：刘楚源 LIU Chu-yuan(Shantou Polytechnic,Shantou 515078,China;Shantou Preschool Education College In Guangdong,Shantou 515041,China)

机构地区：[1]汕头职业技术学院,广东汕头515078 [2]广东汕头幼儿师范高等专科学校,广东汕头515041

出　　处：《青海师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第3期70-77,共8页Journal of Qinghai Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：2020年广东省科技专项资金(“大任务+任务清单”)资助科研项目(200111165873101);汕头职业技术学院科研基金资助项目(SZK2020Y06)

摘　　要：对农业巨灾保险共保模式下的市场因素和市场关系进行分析,建立了农业巨灾保险共保体模式下各市场主体间利益博弈模型,剖析模型中各收益函数,得出各市场主体尽管地位、收益不同,但在利益最大化的原则下,共保体模式皆为最优博弈策略选择;同时从共保体模式下的市场因素和市场关系特点出发,给出建立高效合理共保体体制的一些政策建议.In this paper,according to a research on the market factors and market relations under the coinsurance and reinsurance mode of agricultural catastrophe insurance,the author analyzes the game model of the two major interest subjects in the coinsurance system of agricultural catastrophe insurance,and focuses on the income functions of both in the model to get conclusions that they have different positions and incomes,but both of all choose to join the coinsurance system as their best game strategy,based on the principle of maximizing benefits.Finally we summarize the relevant laws from the game model and give some policy suggestions to establish an efficient and reasonable coinsurance system.

关 键 词：农业巨灾保险 风险偏好 共保体 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F842.64[经济管理—保险]