贝叶斯确证理论视域下的非经验确证问题  

On the Problem of Non-empirical Confirmation from the Perspective of Bayesian Confirmation Theory

作　　者：王刚[1] 李晟[1] WANG Gang;LI Sheng(School of Philosophy,Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610066,China)

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学哲学学院,成都610066

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2023年第4期50-57,共8页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目“印度正理派逻辑思想研究”(22AZX019)

摘　　要：从经验主义的视角来看,运用非经验证据确证科学理论的做法不具备合理性,如何对这一做法的合理性给予辩护的问题即是所谓的“非经验确证问题”。依据贝叶斯确证理论对无替代选项论证进行形式化分析,可以为该问题的解决提供一种可能的思路。然而,这种形式化分析亦有诸多局限性,即,无替代选项论证的确证显著性难以评估、无法为可接受的替代理论提供客观的判定标准、不具有启发式的价值,以及其有效性证明仍然是建立在非经验证据的基础上。From the perspective of empiricism,it is unreasonable to use non-empirical evidence to confirm scientific theories,and the problem of how to defend the rationality of this approach is the so-called“problem of non-empirical confirmation”.The formalized analysis of the No Alternatives Argument based on Bayesian confirmation theory can provide a possible way to solve this problem.However,this formalized analysis also has many limitations.That is,it is difficult to evaluate the confirmatory significance of the No Alternatives Argument,it cannot provide an objective criterion for acceptable alternative theories,it has no heuristic value,and the proof of its validity is still based on non-empirical evidence.

关 键 词：贝叶斯主义 经验确证 非经验确证 无替代选项论证 概率 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]