实践性、语义值与模态——回应关于能力之知的语言学论证  

Practicality,Semantic Value and Modality:A Response to the Linguistic Argument About Knowing How

作　　者：张鑫毅 ZHANG Xin-yi(School of Marxism,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 102249,China)

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学马克思主义学院,北京102249

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2023年第3期38-43,共6页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“虚拟现实的基础伦理学问题研究”(22YJC720022)

摘　　要：能力之知的实践性及其特殊的语用效果表明这类知识与事实之知相区别。斯坦利和威廉姆森论证各类知识归属语句的意义可以得到统一的语义学解释,从而主张能力之知是一种事实之知。该论证的错误在于将心理内容和语义值相等同,这又可以归因于对模态的量化解释。Knowing how’s practicality and special pragmatic effects indicate that they are distinct from knowing that.Stanley and Williams argue that various knowledge-attribution sentences can be given a uniform semantic interpretation,thus claim that knowing how actually is a kind of knowing that.The error of this argument lies in the equivalence of mental content and semantic value,which can be attributed to the quantitative interpretation of modality.

关 键 词：能力之知 实践性 语义值 心理内容 模态 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]