元奠基问题与奠基事实——一种取消主义的观点  

The Meta-Grounding Problem and the Grounding Facts——An Eliminativist View

作　　者：齐晓晨 QI Xiao-chen(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Hebei University,Baoding Hebei 071100,China)

机构地区：[1]河北大学哲学与社会学学院,河北保定071100

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2022年第5期39-45,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“分析的实用主义研究”(17AZX011);国家社会科学基金重大项目“规范性哲学研究”(21&ZD049)

摘　　要：元奠基问题是奠基理论所面临的一个重要挑战,它要求奠基理论回答奠基事实本身被何物所奠基这一问题。简单还原论和关联主义是回应这一问题的两种主流方案,但前者无法满足奠基关系的解释性特征,而后者会破坏奠基理论的理论作用。奠基理论在这一问题上所面临的困难来自对两种不同形而上学解释的混淆,而对这两种解释的区分会导向对奠基事实的取消与对元奠基问题的消解。The meta-grounding problem,which is one of the most important challenges faced by grounding theory,requires the latter to answer what grounds the grounding facts themselves.Simple reductionism and connectivism are the two main answers to this question.However,the former cannot meet the explanatory feature of grounding relations,while the latter threatens the theoretical role of grounding theory.The difficulty comes from a confusion between two different kinds of metaphysical explanations,and deliberate discrimination between these explanations leads to an eliminativist view of the grounding facts.

关 键 词：奠基事实 元奠基问题 形而上学解释 取消主义 

分 类 号：B081.1[哲学宗教—哲学理论]