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作 者:高薇[1] GAO Wei(School of Law,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)
机构地区:[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871
出 处:《江西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2022年第5期76-87,共12页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
基 金:国家社科基金重大项目“5G时代互联网传播方式的变革和治理对策研究”(编号:19ZDA328)
摘 要:科技大企业的垄断问题引起了全球关注。中国、美国和欧盟在近期都明显加强了反垄断力度。但在平台反垄断的工具箱中,除利用竞争政策外,还可以将大型数字企业定性为公用事业或公共承运人。这种思路开启了从平台影响公共利益角度研究其垄断问题的新思路。通过回顾美国公用事业管制的历史并考察美国网络中立性原则的经验,可以看到公用事业管制的基本内容和将其运用于平台监管的可行性。而美国平台反垄断领域的最新案件则反映出,公用事业理论已经进入了司法者视野。对历史经验及近期实践的进一步分析表明,公用事业管制的核心就在于平台活动是否影响大众利益。The monopolistic concern caused by large technology companies has attracted global attention.The US,the EU and China have all significantly strengthened their antitrust efforts recently.But in the platform antitrust toolbox,it is possible to characterize large digital players as utilities or common carriers in addition to exploiting competition policy.This way of thinking opens a new way to study the monopoly problem from the perspective of platform’s influence on public interests.By reviewing the history of public utility regulation in the United States and reviewing the experience of net neutrality in the United States,we can see the basic content of public utility regulation and the feasibility of applying it to platform supervision.The latest cases in the U.S.platform antitrust field reflect that the utility theory has entered the judicial field of view.Further analysis of historical experience and recent practice shows that the core of public utility regulation lies in whether platform activities affect public interests.
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