国际组织领导人选举中的大国竞争逻辑研究——以美国参与2020年WIPO总干事选举为例  

作　　者：毛维准 邱奕暄 

机构地区：[1]南京大学国际关系学院 [2]南京大学亚太发展研究中心 [3]北京大学燕京学堂

出　　处：《复旦国际关系评论》2022年第2期98-132,共35页

摘　　要：国际组织领导人选举是全球治理和大国竞争研究的重要议题,日益成为中美战略竞争的新焦点。本文试图结合威胁评估理论、“委托—代理”模型、选举联盟等理论成果,建构国际组织领导人选举中的大国竞争分析框架,讨论影响特定国家参与竞争的逻辑。美国在2020年世界知识产权组织总干事选举中的系列针对性举动显示,在大国战略竞争背景下,竞争大国支持对象的获胜概率、国际组织及其领导职位的重要性与自主性等因素将会影响大国参与竞争的动机。案例也显示,在竞争策略方面,实现足够规模的选举联合阵线则是国际组织领导人竞争获胜的关键要素。这需要大国在灵活运用选举规则的基础上挑选合适的候选人,并系统性地为其开展有效的外交行动。The leader election in international organizations has been a significant issue in the studies of global governance and great-power competition,which is becoming an emergent focus in the strategic competition between China and US.This article attempts to integrate Threat Assessment theory,Principal-Agent model and Election Alliance theory in order to construct an analytical framework on the great-power competition in the leader election of international organizations,with the hope to discover the logics why a specific country participating in this contest.US'intentional activities in 2020 WIPO Director-General Election show that some variables probably decide the motivations that a great power will compete for an election in international organizations under the context of great-power strategic competition,including the success probability of the candidate the given country supporting,the significance of the specific international organization and the leadership position,and the autonomy of the international organization.The case also displays the importance of election strategy,i.e.building a large enough election alliance plays a key role in winning an election in a given international organization.The case finally implies if a great power wants to win in an election in international organizations it needs to select an adequate candidate,feasibly manipulate the rules of election,and launch effective diplomatic operations in a systematic manner.

关 键 词：国际组织竞争 大国战略竞争 联合国系统 美国 WIPO 总干事选举 

分 类 号：D813[政治法律—国际关系] D871.2[政治法律—政治学]