产能分享平台交易费最优定价策略  被引量:3

Optimal Transaction Fee Strategy for Capacity Sharing Platform

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作  者:郝家芹 赵道致[1] 卓翔芝[2] HAO Jiaqin;ZHAO Daozhi;ZHUO Xiangzhi(College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China;College of Economics and Management,Huaibei Normal University,Huaibei,Anhui 235000,China)

机构地区:[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]淮北师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮北235000

出  处:《工业工程与管理》2022年第1期195-203,共9页Industrial Engineering and Management

基  金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(71472134,72072125);天津大学自主创新基金项目(2019XSC-0008)

摘  要:随着信息技术的发展,闲置产能的分享逐渐成为生产领域重要的产能利用模式。为研究闲置产能分享时交易费最优定价问题,利用双边市场理论和最优化理论,分别建立了以利润最大化为目标的平台(平台Ⅰ)和以社会福利最大化为目标的平台(平台Ⅱ)的基本模型,分析并对比了两类平台的运营模式对最优交易费和参与产能分享企业效用的影响,并将基本模型拓展为兼顾自身利润和参与产能分享的其他企业利益的平台(平台F);探讨了相关参数对最优交易费和参与产能分享企业效用的影响。研究结果表明:平台Ⅰ收取的最优交易费高于平台Ⅱ,降低了参与产能分享企业的效用,损害了参与产能分享企业的利益;平台F的运营模式虽不是最优,但最贴近现实。最后,通过数值例子对文中的结论加以验证,为平台运营商和企业的行为决策提供理论参考依据。With the development of information technology,the idle capacity sharing has gradually become an important capacity utilization mode in the production field.To study the optimal pricing of transaction fee with idle capacity sharing,two basic models,in which the goal of one platform was profit maximization(PlatformⅠ)and the other is maximum social welfare(PlatformⅡ),were established by using the bilateral market theory and optimization theory.This paper analyzed and compared the influence of the operation mode of the two kinds of platforms on the optimal transaction fee and the utility of participating capacity sharing enterprises,and extended the basic models to a platform(platform F)which took into account self-profit and other interests of participating capacity sharing enterprise.This paper discussed the influence of relevant parameters on the optimal transaction fee and participating capacity sharing enterprise utility.The research results show that the optimal transaction fee charged by platformⅠis higher than that of the platformⅡ,and platformⅠreduce the utility and damage the interests of participating capacity sharing enterprises;the operating mode of platform F is not the best,but it is the most realistic.Finally,the conclusions are verified by numerical examples and provided a theoretical reference for the behavior decision of platform operators and enterprises.

关 键 词:产能分享 平台 交易费 社会福利 

分 类 号:F424[经济管理—产业经济] F49

 

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