信息不对称与租赁风险评估  

Information Asymmetry and Lease Risk Evaluation

作　　者：徐翔[1] 王乐鹏[1] 黄立平[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学管理科学与信息系,上海200092

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2004年第3期224-227,共4页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70271034).

摘　　要：随着人们求新求异新潮流的出现,给个人消费品租赁行业带来了巨大的商机.但是由于信息不对称的存在,租赁企业和承租人博弈的结果导致租赁企业"惜租"的政策.通过对承租人信息的收集,并借助信用评估模型来完成对承租人信用进行评估,并由此制定相关的租赁政策,可以有效的控制租赁风险.Due to preference of merchandises novel and fantastic, large markets exist in lease industry in individual consumable. However,gaming between lease firms and leaseholder results in the fact that firms are reluctant to lease. Actually,we can manage and control the lease risks effectively through a credit evaluation module and relevant policy, which can accesses leaseholder's credit with accuracy.

关 键 词：信息不对称 租赁风险评估 个人租赁 信用评估 承租人 租赁企业 

分 类 号：F721.6[经济管理—产业经济] O236[理学—运筹学与控制论]