建设项目成本加酬金合同的激励效用研究  

Study on Incentives Utilities of Cost plus Incentive Fee Contract in Construction Projects

作　　者：赵振宇[1] 谢铁军[2] 刘睿[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学工商管理学院,北京102206 [2]北京科技大学应用科学学院,北京100086

出　　处：《基建优化》2007年第6期1-5,共5页Optimization of Capital Construction

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70572090)

摘　　要：成本加酬金合同是一种常用的建设工程合同类型,应研究其不同激励形式对业主和承包商产生的不同效用。本文基于业主和承包商期望效用,应用委托-代理理论建立了有限责任合同、按固定份额分成合同、按约定公式分成合同等三类合同模式的激励模型。采用规划方法求出模型最优解、并讨论分析激励的实施效用。通过测算各种情况下各模式对业主和承包商的效用,经过求解不等式,可比较出各效用的大小,并可推广到固定总价合同模式。通过建立合同激励模型可进行效用测算,能帮助业主设计既能吸引承包商参与又能扩大业主自身效用的合同模式;也能帮助承包商识别并参与对自身效用较大的合同。Cost plus incentive fee contract is a common contract type in construction projects,the different incentives modes may have different utilities.Based on expected utilities of the owners and the contractors,using the principal-agent theory,three kinds contract incentives models were created,they are: limited liability contract,cost-plus fixed percentage fee contract,and share distribution formula contract.Using programming method,this paper calculated the optimal solutions of these contracts,analyzed their actual incentives utilities.This research calculated the owner's and contractor's utilities,and through inequality calculation,gave a comparison of the different utilities.Moreover,the results may extend to the fixed price contract.The contract incentives model and utilities calculations may help the owners create contracts that could both encourage the contractors and increase the owner's utilities,and assist the contractors to identify and participate the contracts that have higher utilities.

关 键 词：建设项目 成本加酬金合同 委托-代理理论 效用 

分 类 号：TU723[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]