封闭式基金经理的竞争压力  

The Competitive Pressure on the Managers of Close-end Fund

作　　者：姚正春[1] 邓淑芳[1] 李志文[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学,北京100084

出　　处：《金融研究》2006年第9期81-92,共12页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：在中国,基金经理人员任免频繁,一般认为是由于竞争激烈。为了验证这个说法,本文以任免来度量基金经理的竞争压力,而以基金业绩排名来度量基金经理的竞争能力,然后分析基金经理竞争压力与其业绩考核的关系。我们的研究发现,在封闭式基金中,基金管理公司并没有以业绩作为选用经理的标准,那些任职时间长的经理人员的业绩不比任职时间短的业绩优良。本文同时发现各基金的业绩不具有持续性,每期各基金的业绩是否超越同行平均水平的概率与前期业绩无关,都是0．5。这一发现加强了基金经理的任免与业绩无关的推测。The tenure of fund managers in China is noticeably short. The common explanation for this phenomenon is the high competitive pressure in this profession. This paper uses the job tenure to measure the fund manger s job pressure and the industry ranking to measure the manager performance. This paper analyzes the relationship between the fund manger s competitive pressure and their performance. Our study shows that the tenure is not associated with performance ranking. Fund mangers with longer tenure do not ou...

关 键 词：封闭式基金 业绩排名 经理任免 业绩持续性 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224