维特根斯坦《逻辑哲学论》中的“指号”和“符号”  

Sign and Symbol in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

作　　者：刘玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院研究生院哲学系,北京100102

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2008年第11期7-11,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：符号是有指称方式的指号。指号的指称方式就是指号的运用——逻辑句法的运用,因而抽象地说,符号就是逻辑句法。意义对符号(简单指号或命题)或逻辑句法来说无关宏旨。符号与形式或逻辑句法的一致性决定了无意义的命题只是错误的命题,我们实际上并不能表征逻辑上无意义的命题。A symbol is a sign together with a mode of signification.A mode of signification of a sign is its logical syntactic employment,so Abstract speaking,a symbol is just a kind of logical syntactic.Sense has only inessentially significance to a symbol(a simple sign or a proposition) or a logical syntactic.And the identity of form between a symbol and its form or logical syntactic has determined nonsense propositions are just wrong propositions and in fact,we cannot represents logical nonsense propositions.

关 键 词：指号 符号 指称方式 逻辑句法 意义 

分 类 号：B81-06[哲学宗教—逻辑学]