两种政策工具对实施清洁生产企业的激励效果分析  

Analysis on the Incentive Effects of Two Policy Instruments on Cleaner Production Enterprises

作　　者：伍京华[1] 阮平南[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工业大学经济与管理学院,北京100022

出　　处：《北京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第4期32-35,共4页Journal of Beijing University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：北京市自然科学基金资助项目(9002002)

摘　　要：对激励企业实施清洁生产的环境政策工具进行了探讨,分析了清洁生产的经济外部性并建立了相关模型。通过分析,得出可拍卖的交易许可证对该行业实施清洁生产企业的激励效果要优(?)排污税或污染削减补贴的结论。The authors explore the two environmental policy instruments which can motivate enterprises' practicing cleaner production, analyze the economical externality of cleaner production and build the correlated model. It is concluded that the auctionable transaction liscence policy has a better incentive effect on the cleaner production enterprises than the policy of draining contamination tax or pollution reduction subsidy.

关 键 词：环境政策 清洁生产 经济外部性 效用函数 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学] F27