经营者股权激励机制简析  

The research of the inspiring mechanism for the executive's right of stock

作　　者：卢邦贵[1] 佘德容[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310032

出　　处：《浙江工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第1期80-83,共4页Journal of Zhejiang University of Technology：Social Sciences

摘　　要：企业是社会经济的细胞,经营者是企业的灵魂。在所有权与经营权相分离的现代企业中,企业所有者与经营者之间不可避免地存在着“委托—代理”问题,它严重影响着企业的健康发展。解决这一问题的关键是设计合适的股权激励机制。Corporations are the cells of the social economy and executives are the soul of the corporations. In the modem corporations whose proprietary rights and managing rights are separated, it is unavoidable that there exists an 'entrustment - agency' problem between owners and executives. This impedes a sound growth of the corporations. The solution to this problem is to design a suitable inspiring mechanism for the right of stock.

关 键 词：经营者 委托—代理问题 股权激励机制 股票期权 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]