经营者股票期权与管理者收购比较分析  

The analysis of executive stock options and management buy - outs

作　　者：佘德容[1] 卢邦贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,浙江杭州310032

出　　处：《浙江工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2003年第2期161-165,共5页Journal of Zhejiang University of Technology：Social Sciences

摘　　要：经营者股票期权和管理者收购是现代企业产权激励的两种重要模式。它们在西方发达国家得到了广泛运用,并获得了较大成功,也对我国的企业改革产生了一定影响。比较分析二者的内涵、理论基础、内容及运作机理对我国的进一步实践具有重要意义。Executive stock options and management buy - outs are two important incentive models of property rights in modem corporations. These two methods are adopted widely and proved successfully in developed countries and also exert some impact on Chinese corporations. To conduct a comparative study into the connotation, related theories and operation mechanism of the two methods has significant implication for the farther practice in our country.

关 键 词：经营者股票期权 管理者收购 委托—代理理论 人力产权理论 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]