惩罚承诺失信及农村政策扭曲  

Incredible Commitment to Punish and Distortion of Rural Policies

作　　者：谭秋成[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院农村发展研究所

出　　处：《中国农村观察》2012年第3期37-47,70,96-97,共14页China Rural Survey

基　　金：笔者主持的中国社会科学院重大项目"我国农村政策的制定程序与实施机制研究"的部分内容

摘　　要：本文建立了一个中央与地方政府关于农村政策执行的不完全信息动态博弈模型。中央政府制定并颁布一项农村政策,地方政府负责组织实施。由于社会经济发展水平和资源条件的不同,农村政策在各地的适应性也不同。地方政府知道农村政策在本地的真实适应性,而中央政府只知道这一适应性的概率分布。如果冒险扭曲农村政策可获得高额收益、地方政府主要负责人任职的保留效用较低、地方政府负责人对未来的时间贴现率高,则中央政府声明要惩罚政策扭曲者的承诺是无效的;如果中央政府事后检查农村政策执行情况的成本高昂、地方政府预期中央将采取"法不责众"规则,那么,中央政府的惩罚承诺是失信的。当惩罚承诺失效或失信时,政策适应性高的地区的政策执行者将谎称政策在本地的适应性低,扭曲农村政策以谋取私利。This paper builds a dynamic game of incomplete information between the central and local government in implementing rural policies.The central government makes and issues a rural policy and the local government implements this policy.A rural policy has different suitability in different areas because of different economic and social development level and natural endowment.The local government knows the true suitability in its jurisdiction,but the central government only knows the probability distribution of the suitability.When return from distorting the rural policy is high,or when the reserved utility of the principal of local government in his term is low and the principal discounts the future at a high rate,the central government's announcement of punishing those who distort rural policies is ineffective.When the central government's cost to examine the policy implementation is high,or when the local governments expect that the rule of 'too many to punish' will be adopted,the central government's commitment of punishment is incredible.When commitment of punishment is ineffective or incredible,the local governments whose jurisdictions have high policy suitability will lie and claim that suitability in their jurisdictions is low and distort rural policy for their own interests.

关 键 词：农村政策 政府博弈 政策扭曲 

分 类 号：F32[经济管理—产业经济]