基于拍卖合谋理论的建设项目陪标内在机理及其防范  

Inherent Mechanism of Cover Bidding in Construction Project and Its Prevention Based on Collusion Theory in Auction

作　　者：黄居林[1] 董志清[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学管理学院,重庆400067 [2]重庆交通大学理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆交通大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第6期1256-1260,共5页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University(Natural Science)

基　　金：重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目(10SKHO4)

摘　　要：基于拍卖中的合谋理论,分析了陪标的内在机理,包括陪标协议的形成和履行机制、陪标团体及其各个成员的目标及其面临的激励兼容与参与约束条件;结合陪标的内在机理,从抑制串标组织信息交流及其抬高标价的能力、抑制投标人参与串标的意愿及对串标组织进行内部瓦解等方面,分析了当前相关措施的治理效果,指出存在的不足;提出了有针对性的防范与改进措施。Based on the theory of collusion in auction,the inherent mechanism of cover bidding is firstly analyzed,including the formation and performance mechanism of the cover bidding agreement,the goal of cover bidding organization and its members,the incentive compatible and participation constraint conditions faced by every member.Then combined with the inherent mechanism,the effects of relevant prevention measures are analyzed from the aspects,such as restraining information exchange,blocking bidding up the price,inhibiting the participation intention of cover bidding and making cover bidding organization internal collapse,mean while the shortcomings of these measures are also pointed out.Finally,the corresponding improvements of these measures are brought forward.

关 键 词：陪标 建设项目 机理 合谋 拍卖 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]