检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
机构地区:[1]浙江理工大学建筑工程学院,浙江杭州310018
出 处:《改革与战略》2012年第5期66-69,共4页Reformation & Strategy
基 金:住房和城乡建设部软科学研究项目(2011-R3-15)
摘 要:文章借鉴制造业虚拟组织的利益分配机制,结合工程项目集成化管理实际,分析了工程项目集成化管理利益剩余的产生渠道,确定了工程项目集成化管理利益剩余的评价指标;根据利益剩余种类的不同,运用合作博弈理论,构建了基于Nash谈判模型的工程项目集成化管理利益剩余总量分配模型,以及基于Shapley值的工程项目集成化管理无形利益剩余分布模型,并基于两种模型给出了确定工程项目集成化管理利益分配方案的方法;最后,通过一个算例仿真验证了模型的可行性和合理性。结果表明,该模型能够综合考虑工程项目集成化管理的直接经济利益剩余和无形利益剩余,计算简单,结果合理,是一种效果较好的工程项目集成化管理利益剩余评估分配方法。The emergence mechanism of the project integrated management profit and its evaluation index were firstly analyzed. Then,according to the difference categories of the profit,and based on the cooperative game theory,a total profit allocation model based on The Nash Negotiation Model and a intangible profit distribution model based on The Shapley Value were established,and the method which is used to calculate the profit allocation scheme was presented.Finally,the feasibility and rationality were tested by a case simulation.Results show that:it is a relative useful profit allocation model of the project integrated management for the reason that both the immediate economic profit and the intangible profit can be comprehensive considered by the model besides its simple calculation and reliable results.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.7