国家助学贷款政策缘何陷入困境?--基于博弈论的视角  

Why the National Student loan Policy is in Trouble? —Based on Game Theory Perspective

作　　者：宗刚[1] 杨一博 

机构地区：北京工业大学经济与管理学院 北京 100124[1] 北京工业大学循环经济研究院 北京 100124[2]

出　　处：《当代教育论坛》2012年第4期26-30,共5页forum on contemporary education

基　　金：北京市重点学科资助项目“‘资源、环境及循环经济’交叉学科自助计划”(033000541212002);北京工业大学学科与研究生教育专项基金(011000541211020)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：国家助学贷款是践行教育公平理念的重要政策之一。国家助学贷款所涉及的利益主体被归纳为银行、贷款学生和第三方中介,以博弈论为工具分析三方主体的决策取向,解释了目前的助学贷款政策施行乏力的现象。银行的经济人属性是其缺乏放贷动力的主要原因;信用制度体系的不完善和不合理的还款制度是学生高违约率的主要原因;而风险补偿金机制的引入使得贷款风险向政府和高校转移是第三方中介不积极支持助学贷款政策的主要原因。National Student Loan stakeholders involved are summarized as banks,student loans and third-party intermediary.Using game theory as a tool this paper analyzes the three main decision-making approaches to explain the current weakness of the student loan policy implementation phenomenon.Bank's attributes of economic man is the main reason for its lack of lending power;credit system is imperfect and unreasonable repayment system is the main reason for students to high default rates;and risk compensation mechanism allows the introduction of credit risk to the government and universities transfer is not actively support third-party intermediary student loan policy,which is the main reason.

关 键 词：助学贷款 三方博弈 信用制度 风险补偿金机制 

分 类 号：G647[文化科学—高等教育学]