考虑信息粘性和正外部性的服务合作生产激励机制  

Service Co-Production Incentive Mechanism with Information Stickiness and Positive Externalities

作　　者：李慧芬[1] 杨德礼[1] 王建军[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第3期28-32,共5页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目:"面向服务的商务智能与知识管理方法研究"(70890083);国家自然科学基金青年项目:"承包商能力与关系质量对承接IT服务外包成功的影响机理"(70902033)

摘　　要：知识密集型服务是客户与供应商合作生产的系统,双方信息粘性大小和正合作外部性强度影响激励机制的设计。模型综合考虑信息粘性成本对互补型服务合作生产控制权结构及定价机制的影响。研究结果表明,信息粘性导致了契约不完全性及服务效率的下降;双方信息粘性总成本及合作正外部性强度决定着剩余控制权结构;剩余控制权结构、信息粘性总成本及合作正外部性强度共同影响合作服务的定价。The co-production processes of knowledge-intensive services across client and provider organizations have costly information stickiness as well as positive externalities,and they would result in impacts on the design of incentive mechanism.We model the implications and find that information stickiness is linked to the loss of service efficiency and contributes to contract incompleteness;both the total information stickiness expenditures of each side and their positive externalities determine the residual right allocation;residual right,information stickiness and positive externalities jointly have impacts on pricing of service co-production.

关 键 词：服务合作生产 信息粘性 正外部性 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F719[经济管理—产业经济] F224