高管审计背景与审计定价:基于角色视角  

Top Manager's Audit Experience and Audit Pricing:From the Perspectives of Roles

作　　者：张俊民[1] 胡国强[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2013年第2期25-34,共10页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272189);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(12YJA790193)

摘　　要：基于高管角色视角,考察公司高管审计背景对审计定价的影响。研究发现:相比高管无审计背景的公司,会计师事务所对高管有审计背景的公司并没有收取明显不同的审计费用,这主要是由于审计师察觉到具有审计背景的高管的角色差异并将这一角色差异反映在审计定价中。进一步的分类回归发现:会计师事务所对决策高管尤其是执行董事与财务总监具有审计背景的公司收取了相对较高的审计费用,但对监督高管尤其是独立董事具有审计背景的公司收取了相对较低的审计费用。This paper examines the impact of top managers' audit experience(AEX) on audit pricing mainly from the perspective of top managers' role.We find that audit firms do not charge companies whose top managers with AEX,the difference of audit fees vary significantly from companies whose top managers without such audit experience.This mainly results from the differentiation of these managers' position roles.Auditors are aware of this and thus adjust audit fees accordingly.Respective regression analysis shows that,audit firms do charge companies whose decision-making managers with AEX significantly higher audit fees,especially,these companies whose executive directors and CFOs have AEX.However,audit firms do charge companies that supervise managers with AEX significantly lower audit fees,especially,for these companies have independent directors with AEX.

关 键 词：高管角色 高管审计背景 审计风险 审计定价 审计师行为 审计费用 审计意见 审计市场 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学] F224[经济管理—国民经济]