控股股东行为与管理层业绩预告披露策略——以我国A股上市公司为例  

Action of Control Shareholders and the Information Disclosure Strategy of Management: An Empirical Study of China A Share Listed Companies

作　　者：高敬忠[1] 韩传模[1] 王英允[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学商学院,天津300222 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300222

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2013年第4期75-83,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272189);教育部人文社会科学研究项目青年项目(10JYC630006);天津市财政局重点会计科研项目(kjkyxm132401)

摘　　要：以我国A股上市公司管理层业绩预告为例,检验了控股股东行为对上市公司业绩预告披露策略选择的影响。检验结果发现:总体而言,在控股股东对上市公司管理层业绩预告作用中利益防御动机与利益趋同动机同时存在,并随着控股股东持股比例的变化,其作用也在利益防御效应和趋同效应之间变化。为了促使控股股东与中小股东在业绩预告披露中的利益一致性,我们需要以提高控股股东的独立性为核心强化控股股东对上市公司信息披露行为的监督作用。Taking the earnings forecast of A listed companies in China as example,we test that how the action of control shareholders affects the choice of a listed company information disclosure strategy.We find that the relation to the stock proportion by control share holders to the precision of management earnings forecast is 'U' shape,but as to a forecast error,timeliness and attitude inclination(including forecast bias and lean) is an inversed 'U' shape.The result shows that with the change of the stock proportion by control shareholders,its effect also changes between the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect.In order to promote the alignment effect of the control shareholders and small shareholders,we should improve the independence of the control shareholders to consolidate the supervising effect.

关 键 词：控股股东行为 管理层业绩预告策略 信息披露策略 精确性 及时性 态度倾向 决策有用性 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51F275