基于演化博弈理论的安全生产监管效果研究  

Study on Safety Production Supervision Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：沈斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江农林大学经管学院,杭州311300

出　　处：《工业安全与环保》2013年第2期68-70,74,共4页Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70773051)

摘　　要：建立演化博弈模型分析长期以来政府安监部门监管的效果问题。通过分析模型和数据实验可以发现,政府安监部门在事故后监管行为中收取的罚金额大小对演化结果的影响比较显著;安全生产投资额大小对演化结果有较大影响。The article discusses the set up of the evolutionary game model to analyze the safety production regulating effect.It is found based on the model and data experiment:①the amount of the fine that the governmental safety supervision departments receive if the accident occurs obviously affects the evolutionary results.②the amount of the safety production investment has great influences on the evolutionary results.

关 键 词：演化博弈理论 安全生产 监管 

分 类 号：X922[环境科学与工程—安全科学]