基于规则正当性认同的制度“非均衡”分析  

An Analysis of Due Rule-based Non-equilibrium Institution

作　　者：朱宪辰[1] 关宏宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济学系,江苏南京210094

出　　处：《理论学刊》2013年第3期44-47,128,共4页Theory Journal

摘　　要：为了理解中国转型过程中出现的冲突,基于个体方法论的制度内生框架,可以将其归纳为交往规则正当性认同的制度"非均衡"状态。并存的规则认同有两种,一是"平起平坐愿买愿卖,说话算数不欺不赖"的对等"交易规则",二是不对等的"支配—服从与照顾—依赖"的"父爱规则"。虽然"交易规则"认同在市场化进程中比例得以扩大,但是"父爱规则"在群体认同中更占优。依据"父爱规则",对是否获得公平照顾的认定差异导致的冲突难以协调。On the basis of the endogenous framework of an individual methodology,the conflicts in transitional China can be reduced into a 'non-equilibrium' system,which acknowledges the trade engagement to be legitimate.There are two existing rules.One is a totally fair play but the other is a submissive or favorable engagement of nonidentity.Although the former is identified by more and more people in the marketplace,the latter actually wins more dominant group identification.Based on favorable rule,it is difficult to coordinate the conflicts resulting from the different attitudes to favorable engagement.

关 键 词：制度内生分析 主观博弈 共享知识 规则偏好 父爱主义 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]