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机构地区:[1]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100 [2]海信集团有限公司,山东青岛266071
出 处:《理论学刊》2013年第3期62-66,129,共5页Theory Journal
基 金:山东省自然科学基金项目"山东省上市公司治理对技术创新的促进效应研究"(项目编号:ZR2012GM004)的阶段性成果
摘 要:运用2007—2010年中国中小上市公司的平衡面板数据,对金字塔结构的主要变量——终极控制人现金流权、控制权、两权分离度等对技术创新绩效的影响进行实证检验,研究发现:终极股东现金流权与技术创新投入显著正相关,控制权与技术创新产出显著负相关;两权偏离程度对技术创新投入与产出均具有显著的抑制效应。同时,也证实了机构投资者对于技术创新绩效的积极效应。因此,应对中小上市公司的金字塔结构进行合理优化,强化机构投资者的积极治理行为,并构建声誉激励与信任评价等机制积极引导控股股东支持技术创新的长期行为。According to 2007-2010 data of balanced panel of China's small and medium-sized listed companies,an empirical test is made to check the influence of the main variables in the pyramid structure,that is,the ultimate controller's cash flow rights,control rights and their separation degree on innovatively technological performance.The result shows that a ultimate shareholder's cash flow right is in positive relation with innovatively technological input while controlling right is in negative relation with innovatively technological output.Their deviation can hamper the input and output of the technical innovation.At the same time,it also confirms the positive effects of institutional investors are conductive to the performance of innovative technology.Therefore,rational optimization should be made to the pyramid structure of the small and medium-sized listed companies.Positive management of institutional investors should be further encouraged and such mechanisms as name incentive and trust evaluation should be set up to actively guide the majority shareholder to give a long-term support for technological innovation.
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