定向增发缘何演变成大股东获取控制权收益的工具?——基于驰宏锌锗案例的研究  

Why Private Placement Becomes an Instrument for Controlling Shareholders to Grab Private Benefits of Control?——A Case Study on Yunnan Chihong Zinc & Germanium Co.,Ltd.

作　　者：郭思永[1] 张鸣[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院会计与财务学院,上海201620 [2]上海财经大学会计与财务研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《南京审计学院学报》2013年第4期47-57,共11页journal of nanjing audit university

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10CGL040);国家自然科学基金项目(71172017);上海市教委重点学科基金资助项目(J51701);上海市教育委员会"教师专业发展工程"(2011年)项目

摘　　要：以驰宏锌锗面向大股东定向增发为案例,对大股东控制下的上市公司将股改与定向增发捆绑于一起的真正原因进行剖析,结果显示:大股东通过将股改和定向增发捆绑于一起来操纵定向增发发行价格和利用低质资产认购股份,巩固了其在上市公司的控制权地位,获取了控制权收益,从而使得中小股东的利益受损。另外,作为市场运行机制规则制定者的政府所设计的非公开发行制度存在的缺陷致使大股东利用对上市公司的控制权,方便地通过定向增发这一关联交易"谋求"到了自身利益的最大化,侵害了小股东的利益,加剧了大股东和小股东之间的代理冲突。Based on the case of private placement towards controlling shareholders of Yunnan Chihong Zinc&Germanium Co.,Ltd.,the paper explores the underlying reasons why listed companies,under the control of controlling shareholders,bind the splitting-share reform with private placement: to control the issuing price of private placement,to consolidate the controlling shareholder's dominate position through injecting the low-quality assets to grab private benefits of control at the sacrifice of minority shareholders' interest.Furthermore,the non-public offering system developed by government has its defects which result in big shareholders' control of listed companies,and their maximization of their own interests against the interests of minority shareholders through private placement,thus exacerbating the agency conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders.

关 键 词：大股东 定向增发 控制权收益 控股股东 股权分置改革 公开发行制度 资产注入 驰宏锌锗 

分 类 号：F406.72[经济管理—产业经济] F426.3