消费者多方购买行为与企业R&D策略博弈分析  

The Game Analysis of Firms' R&D Decisions in Markets with Multihoming

作　　者：邢明青[1] 王来生[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国农业大学理学院,北京10083

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2008年第S1期373-376,共4页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60573158;10771213)

摘　　要：通过构建完全信息博弈模型,研究具有网络外部性的产品市场中,在存在消费者多方购买行为时企业的研发策略和创新动机,并深入分析多方购买者比例大小和网络外部性强度对企业研发投资水平的影响。在市场中存在多方购买行为时均衡结果表明:(i)企业有动机进行研发投资;(ii)研发企业均衡价格、需求以及利润均高于不研发企业;(iii)在差异度系数和投资系数都充分大时研发企业最优研发投入随着多方购买者比例的增加而增大。最后通过具体算例分析知道:在考虑多方购买条件下,市场中存在研发时消费者总剩余和社会总福利高于市场中不存在研发时的情形。Using complete information game models,we study firms' R&D decisions and innovation incentives when there are multihoming consumers in markets with network externalities,and examine the effect of the proportion of multihoming and intensity of network externality on the level of R&D.As considering multihoming behavior in the markets,the equilibrium results show that:(i)Firms have incentives to choose R&D;(ii)The firm which chooses R&D will set higher prices,gain bigger demands and more profits than the one which isn't in equilibrium;(iii) The bigger the proportion of the multihoming consumer,the higher the level of R&D in the case of the differentiation parameter and the investing parameter being big enough.At last,a numerical example indicates that the aggregate consumer surplus and aggregate social welfare when exist R&D in the market is higher than those in the opposite case.

关 键 词：R&D 多方购买行为 网络外部性 技术创新 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F274