法律实施与利益选择——以行政诉讼和解制度为例  

Implementation of Law and Selection of Interests——From the Perspective of the Administrative Litigation Reconciliation System

作　　者：王霁霞[1] 唐克[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学,北京100083

出　　处：《北京人民警察学院学报》2013年第5期29-32,共4页Journal of Beijing People‘s Police College

基　　金：中央基本科研业务费项目"法的实效研究"(编号:FRF-TP-12-123A)的研究成果

摘　　要：行政诉讼和解制度是政府与相对人在司法实践中基于自身利益进行的行为选择,共同改变了《行政诉讼法》规定的纸面规则。其中上级政府的量化指标考核与和解制度的成本低、收益小是政府与相对人选择和解制度的核心原因。这一现象说明行为主体在各自的生存环境下做出了与法律规则不一致的利益选择,这些实际选择一定程度上虚置和瓦解了纸面的法律规则。因此,在法律制度建构时应充分考虑行为主体的生存环境与利益选择。The administrative litigation reconciliation system is the common choice of government and counter parties in the judicial practice based on their own interests, which alters the rule of"Administrative Procedure Law".Quantitative indicators assessed by the higher levels of government and the low cost of reconciliation system are the most important reasons. The interests and choices of behavioral agents are inconsistent with the laws, which collapse the provision of law. Therefore, the living environments and interest selection of behavioral agents should be fully considered in constructing legal systems.

关 键 词：行政诉讼和解 法律实施 利益选择 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学] D9[政治法律—中外政治制度]