股权特性、投资者情绪与企业非效率投资  

Ownership Properties,Investor Sentiment and Corporate Inefficient Investment

作　　者：罗琦[1] 张标[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财贸研究》2013年第4期148-156,共9页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于控股股东市场择时动机的公司投融资行为研究"(71272230);国家自然科学基金项目"大股东控制下企业现金持有量影响投资支出的价值效应研究"(70872035)

摘　　要：在管理者理性而投资者非理性的分析框架下,研究投资者情绪对企业非效率投资的影响以及该影响因控股股东特性不同而表现出的差异性,并以2005—2011年中国上市公司为样本进行实证检验。结果表明,投资者情绪与企业投资不足显著负相关,而与企业过度投资显著正相关。进一步研究得出:控股股东持股比例低时,投资者情绪与企业投资不足负相关性更强,而控股股东持股比例高时,投资者情绪与企业过度投资正相关性更强;相比于国有企业,非国有企业非效率投资受投资者情绪影响更大;终极控股股东两权不发生分离时投资者情绪与非效率投资无关,而两权分离时投资者情绪会加剧过度投资。In the framework that managers are rational and investors are irrational, using panel data of Chinese listed companies during 2005-2011, this article analyses whether investor sentiment affects inefficient investment under controlling of large shareholders with different properties. Study indicates that investor sentiment has significant negative effect on corporate under-investment behavior, and has significant positive effect on corporate over-investment behavior. The correlation between investor sentiment and over-investment is stronger in case of controlling shareholder with high share proportion, but the correlation between investor sentiment and under-investment is weaker when the share proportion is high. Compared to national companies, private companies have a stronger correlation between investor sentiment and inefficient investment. Investor sentiment can mitigate under-investment when there are no divergence between control rights and cash flow rights, but furtherance over-investment when there are divergence between control rights and cash flow rights.

关 键 词：控股股东 投资者情绪 投资不足 过度投资 

分 类 号：F7[经济管理—产业经济]