证券分析师舞弊警示能力及其信息传递方式——基于证监会处罚公告的经验证据  

Anticipation Capability and Signal Mode That Analysts Use to Communicate Financial Fraud: Empirical Evidences from Punishment Bulletins by CSRC

作　　者：袁春生[1] 唐松莲[2] 汪涛武[3] 

机构地区：[1]江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西南昌330022 [2]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237 [3]南昌工程学院经济贸易学院,江西南昌330099

出　　处：《财贸研究》2013年第6期133-141,共9页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"民营上市公司外聘高管的代理成本与激励机制效果:基于经理人市场视角"(71262025);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"治理环境;外部监督机制与上市公司财务舞弊防范"(09YJC630108);国家社会科学基金项目"非正式制度对我国会计准则执行的影响研究"(12BJY015)

摘　　要：利用2005—2011年间被中国证券监管部门处罚的舞弊公司及未舞弊公司为对象,考察分析师是否具备舞弊警示能力,以及通过何种方式向市场传递舞弊警示信息。研究发现:与未舞弊公司相比,舞弊公司初始舞弊发生前一季度末、舞弊期初季度末以及舞弊结束季度末的分析师评级往往较低,但舞弊发生前二季度末的股票投资评级,以及跟踪分析师数量并无显著差异;跟踪分析师数量越多,舞弊公司的股票投资评级越低。结果表明,分析师具备一定的舞弊警示能力,有效的舞弊警示信息传递方式是分析师评级而非跟踪分析师数量,跟踪分析师数量更可能是分析师具备舞弊警示能力的重要原因而不是公司舞弊所引致的分析师自选择结果。Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies punished by CSRC and its' matched companies in 2005- 2011,this paper examines w hether analysts can anticipate the fraud and w hat signals analysts may use to communicate financial fraud to security market. The results are:( 1) the analysts' recommendations for fraudulent companies at the end of one quarter before the first fraud behavior,and the end of quarter in first fraudulent behavior,or at the end of last quarter of fraud behavior,are more inferior to that for no- fraudulent companies;( 2) The analysts' coverage of fraudulent companies and non-fraudulent companies has no significant difference;( 3) The more analysts' coverage,the more inferior stock recommendations of fraudulent companies. The results above mean that analysts have capability of anticipate corporate financial fraud,and the efficient instrument used to signals corporate financial fraud information is not analysts' coverage but stock recommendations. The analysts' coverage number is not the result caused by analysts' self-selection in corporate fraud but the determinant of the capability of analysts' anticipate corporate financial fraud.

关 键 词：分析师评级 分析师跟踪 公司舞弊 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F224