双重道德风险下具有时间偏好的“公司+农户”价格设计与契约稳定性研究  

Study on the Price Design and Contract Stability of "Company+Farmer" with Time Preference under Double Moral Hazard

作　　者：高阔[1] 甘筱青[1] 

机构地区：[1]九江学院,江西九江332005

出　　处：《湖北农业科学》2013年第6期1487-1489,共3页Hubei Agricultural Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70962002;71162023);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(12YJC630050);江西省社会科学研究"十二五"规划项目(12GL10)

摘　　要：首先分析了"公司+农户"模式存在的双重道德风险及公司和农户的时间偏好成本,通过静态博弈模型揭示"公司+农户"模式履约率不高的原因在于市场风险的存在,即市场价格的波动,契约稳定的市场价格是一个区间而非一个特定数值。同时分析违约金额、市场交易成本和时间偏好成本对契约稳定的价格区间幅度的影响,发现违约金额、市场交易成本和时间偏好成本正向影响契约稳定的价格区间幅度。The double moral hazard of "company+farmer" and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed.According to static game model,it was revealed that the reason for low compliance rate of "company + farmer" model was the existence of market risk,i.e.the fluctuation of market price,the market price stabilized by the contract was a interval instead of a given number.The effect of default penalty,market transaction cost and time preference cost on the stability of contract was studied.It was found that default penalty,market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range stabilized by the contract.

关 键 词：“公司+农户” 双重道德风险 时间偏好 价格设计 契约稳定 

分 类 号：S[农业科学]