认知封闭原则与逻辑全能问题  

Epistemic Closure Principle and Logical Omniscience

作　　者：黄玉兰[1] 陈晓华[1] 

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学哲学系,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第1期27-32,共6页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(11YJA72040001)

摘　　要：关于认知封闭原则的研究是当代认识论中的一个重要话题,而现代逻辑工具是讨论这一话题的基本工具。逻辑全能问题是在认知逻辑系统把认知封闭原则作为初始公理的一种结果,其与认知封闭问题虽然侧重点不一样,但是两者是可以相互阐释的。考察认知封闭原则的不断修正以逼近理性认知主体一般直觉的研究历程,对于理解与解决逻辑全能问题,具有重要的启发价值。Epistemic closure principle is an important topic in the theory of knowledge,and logic is the basic tool for the discussion of this topic. Logical omniscience problem is the result of epistemic closure principle as an initial axiom in the systems of epistemic logic,which both presuppose idealized cognitive subject. There are some differences,i. e. epistemic closure principle is the cognitive group,while the logical omniscience problem is relative to the cognitive subject who is characterized by epistemic logic system. Because of the presupposed idealized cognitive subject,the subject's cognitive ability is the absolute correctness,which can lead to that epistemic closure principle is failure and the logic omniscience subject is not intuitive. From this point of view,the analysis of epistemic closure principle contributes to the reason analysis of the logical omniscience,and the solution to the logical omniscience also contributes to the defence of epistemic closure principle.

关 键 词：认知封闭 认知主体 逻辑全能 

分 类 号：B812[哲学宗教—逻辑学]