民营企业进入国防工业市场的演化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Private Enterprises' Entry into National Defense Industrial Market

作　　者：冯朝军[1] 刘云[1] 樊威[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《兵工学报》2009年第S1期31-35,共5页Acta Armamentarii

摘　　要：民营企业进入国防工业市场将成为社会主义市场经济发展的一个重要趋势。为了分析民营企业进入国防工业市场的条件和进入时机的选择,探求影响民营企业进入军工市场的决定性因素,以民营企业和在位军工企业为研究对象,以演化博弈的复制动态方法为工具,构建了演化博弈模型,分析了民营企业进入国防工业市场的条件及其演化稳定策略。结果表明,如果在位军工企业选择抵制策略所付出的成本高于默许的损失,则经过一段时间的博弈之后,双方的选择将会理性地选择进入或默许策略。并在此基础上,对政府鼓励民营企业进入国防工业领域政策的制定与调整进行了初步研究。Private enterprises' entry into national defense industrial market is an important trend to the development of the socialist market economy.In order to analyze the condition and the timing of private enterprise entry into national defense industrial market,and to search for the determining factor of private enterprises entry into national defense industrial market,taking private enterprises and military enterprises as the study objects,an evolutionary game model was established by the tool of replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory,the condition and the evolutionary stable strategy for private enterprises' entry into national defense industrial marke was analyzed.The results show that if the cost of military enterprises choosing resist strategy higher than the loss of consent,the two sides of game will select the strategy of entry or consent after a period of game.On this basis,making and adjustment of the policy for encouraging private enterprises' entry into national defense industrial market by government were investigated primarily.

关 键 词：民营企业 国防工业市场 演化博弈 政策建议 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F426.48F276.5