基于端信息跳变DoS攻击防护机制中的插件策略  

Plug-in policy for DoS attack defense mechanism based on end hopping

作　　者：贾春福[1,2] 林楷[1] 鲁凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学信息技术科学学院,天津300071 [2]国家计算机病毒应急处理中心,天津300457

出　　处：《通信学报》2009年第S1期114-118,共5页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(60973141);天津市自然科学基金资助项目(09JCYBJ00300)~~

摘　　要：拒绝服务(DoS)攻击严重威胁着计算机网络的安全,并造成了巨大的损失。石乐义等人提出了一种新的基于端信息跳变的网络安全防护模型,可以有效地抵御DoS攻击。在对该模型的防护机制进行深入分析后,发现其中具有潜在的端信息网络泄漏问题,可能导致端信息跳变模型形同虚设。于是,对原有模型加以改进,提出了一组插件策略,对客户端进行认证,并且隐藏了服务器的真实端信息。实验结果表明,该插件机制能够很好地防止端信息网络泄漏,并且不影响服务器的网络性能。Denial of service(DoS) attacks have been a serious threat on the computer network security, and have caused huge loss.Shi et al.proposed a new network security model based on end hopping, which can effectively defend DoS at-tacks.By analyzing the end hopping mechanism, a serious problem in it was found, namely, the network leakage of end information, which is likely to invalidate the function of this mechanism.Therefore, a set of plug-in policies are added to the original model, which authenticate the clients and conceal the actual end information of servers.Experimental results show that the plug-in mechanism is able to avoid the network leakage of end information and imposes little influence on the capacity of servers.

关 键 词：端信息跳变 网络对抗 拒绝服务 插件 服务跳变 

分 类 号：TP393.08[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]