Phishing行为及网络金融机构应对策略的博弈分析(英文)  

Behaviors of Online Financial Institutions Confronted with Phishing: A Game Theoretic Analysis

作　　者：刘业政[1] 丁正平[1] 袁雨飞 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥230009 [2]The Degroote School of Business Mcmaster University Canada

出　　处：《电子科技大学学报》2009年第S1期37-44,共8页Journal of University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

摘　　要：Phishing是近年来新出现的一种网络欺诈,是指欺诈者(Phisher)通过大量发送欺骗性垃圾邮件或采用其他的方式,意图引诱疏于防范的网络用户登陆假冒的知名站点,从而窃取个人敏感信息的一种攻击方式。这种欺诈行为给网络用户尤其是网络金融机构的用户带来了大量的损失,也给网络金融机构带来了危害。该文在分析Phisher和网络金融机构的损益函数的基础上,建立了它们之间的二阶段动态博弈模型,并通过对纳什均衡的分析,求出了网络金融机构面对Phishing欺诈的最优策略。Phishing is an online fraud emerging in recent years. It refers to luring techniques used by identity thieves (Phishers) to fish for personal information in a pond of unsuspecting Internet users. It is a general term for the creation and use by Phishers of e-mails and websites that have been designed to look like they come from well-known, legitimate and trusted websites. Such fraud behavior may cause a great loss for the internet users, especially users of using financial services. Meanwhile, it may also damage the online financial institutions. How should financial institutions respond to the threat from the phishers? Based on the analysis of profit and loss function of Phishers and online financial institutions, a two-phase dynamic game model is established to obtain the optimal strategy for online financial institutions against Phishing by way of Nash-Equilibrium analysis.

关 键 词：基 博弈 网络金融机构 PHISHING 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] F224