单调集对策及合成对策的边缘值  

A MARGINALISTIC VALUE FOR MONOTONIC SET GAMES AND THEIR COMPOSITION GAME

作　　者：闫慧臻[1] 张亚东[1] 刘广智[1] 张盛开[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连轻工学院运筹研究所,大连116001

出　　处：《经济数学》1998年第4期1-5,共5页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金;大连市政府资助

摘　　要：本文给出了单调集对策及其合成对策的边缘值，它类似于我们所熟知的TU—对策的Shapley值及文献[6]．集对策的边缘值的意义在于允许局中人共享项目．这使得不能分割的项目在局中人之间的分配成为可能．我们给出了这种边缘值的一些性质，并讨论了合成集对策的核及其子对策的核之间的关系．In this paper we characterize a value,called a marginalistic value,for monotonic set games and their composition game,which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games and [6]. The marginalistic value for set games allows players to share items. This makes it possible to consider situations where indivisible items must be allocated to the players. We give a few properties of the marginalistic value,and we discuss the relationship between the core of a composition set game and the cores of its sub-games.

关 键 词：单调集对策 合成集对策 边缘值 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]