晋升机制下地方政府官员的行为——一个与中央政府(官员)博弈的实证分析  

Behaviors of the Chinese local government officials in the framework of promotional mechanism——An empirical analysis of games between local government officials and central authorities

作　　者：荆丽丽[1] 刘福森[1] 梁秀文[1] 

机构地区：[1]青岛工学院基础教育学院,山东胶州266300

出　　处：《新余学院学报》2013年第6期38-40,共3页Journal of Xinyu University

摘　　要：地方政府官员与中央政府(官员)在不同制度组合中进行博弈,选择适应性行为。而正是这种行为最终影响其能否获得中央政府(官员)的晋升认可。The Chinese local government officials and the central authorities play games in different groups of institutions,which makes them choose adaptive behaviors. And finally it is the behaviors that become important factors in their winning the promotion from central authorities.

关 键 词：晋升 正式制度 非正式制度 地方政府官员 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学]