中国铁路区域公司化改革的路网接入定价研究——基于福利经济学的离散模型  

Research on Railway Network Access Pricing among the Regional Integrative Railway Companies Founded on a Hypothetic Reform in Chinese Railway Industry——Based on the Discrete Model of Welfare Economics

作　　者：马晓飞[1] 王欣[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学公共管理学院,北京100876 [2]北京交通大学科学技术处,北京100044

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期31-35,共5页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目:"贯彻落实科学发展观;深化垄断行业改革--大型国有垄断企业的治理结构和政府规制结构研究"(07&ZD015)

摘　　要：文章提出将中国铁路现存各铁路局横向重构为若干一体化的区域铁路公司的改革思路,并针对区域铁路公司间互联互通中的关键问题,即相互间路网接入定价问题提出6项合理假设并设计模型,运用博弈理论中扩展式博弈和福利经济学的相关理论对路网接入定价与社会福利的关系问题进行了数理分析。研究表明,路网接入价格的高低并不影响铁路公司的市场份额而仅影响其利润,相对较低的路网接入价格不会影响长途铁路运输市场票价同时会产生较高的社会福利。所以,规制部门应该对路网接入价格采取部分规制措施,制定价格上限,从而使社会福利接近最优。This paper proposes a reform idea that restructuring and merging the existing railway bureaus into several larger regional integrative railway companies horizontally in Chinese railway industry,by analyzing the factors affecting China railway reform.It discusses the railway network access pricing which is the key point for interconnection among the hypothetic regional integrative railway companies.The paper applies the theories of extensive form of game and welfare economics to research on the relations between access pricing and social welfare,by modeling based on six assumptions.The study shows that railway network access pricing does not affect the regional railway company's market share and only affects their profits,the lower access pricing will not affect the long distance rail transport price,and will result in higher social welfare.Therefore,regulatory authorities should partly control the access pricing and make the price caps in order to make the social welfare close to the optimal.

关 键 词：铁路改革 区域铁路公司 路网接入定价 社会福利 

分 类 号：F530.5[经济管理—产业经济]