创业企业导入期融资策略的演化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Selection of Financing Strategies about Startup Companies in Startup Period

作　　者：罗震[1] 王国红[1] 马慧 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024 [2]大连银行博士后工作站,辽宁大连116021

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期72-76,共5页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目:"基于区域承载力的产业集成路径研究"(71073014)

摘　　要：文章利用演化博弈方法研究了处于导入期的创业企业融资策略选择(指在股权融资和债权融资间选择)的演化过程,建立了投融资双方模式选择的演化博弈模型,分析了投融资双方在股权模式和债权模式两种策略下的选择行为,并根据复制动态方程得到了双方投融资模式选择的演化规律,给出各种情况下的演化稳定策略。结果表明:债权模式是民间资本和创业企业的首选投融资模式;只有当民间资本和创业企业双方的股权投融资模式利润都高于债权时,在经过重复博弈后双方才会选择股权模式,最后提出了达到稳态投融资模式发展路径的相应建议。The evolutionary selection process of financing strategies(including equity financing and credit financing)about startup enterprises in startup period is studied using the method of evolutionary game.We analyzed the mode selection behavior of both sides to the equity mode and the credit mode by building an evolutionary game model between the investors and financiers.In terms with the replicator dynamics equation and the evolutionary stabilization strategy in each case,we obtained the evolutionary law of the mode selection behavior.It is found that credit pattern is the preferred choice both of private capital investment and startup enterprises financing;only when the equity investment and financing mode profits of both private capital and startup enterprises are higher than credit mode,can both sides choose equity mode after repeated game.The corresponding suggestions for the development of equity and credit mode are proposed.

关 键 词：融资策略 股权模式 债权模式 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]