集群核心企业与配套企业的协同创新博弈分析及收益分配调整  

The Collaborative Innovation and Benefit Allocation Between the Core Firm and Its Supporter in Clusters

作　　者：杜欣[1] 邵云飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2013年第S2期745-750,共6页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172095);科技部科技基础性工作专项资助项目(20111M020100)

摘　　要：随着产业集群的发展和升级,集群呈现出以少数核心企业为龙头,相关配套企业围绕在其周围的生产格局。核心企业与配套企业之间的合作成为集群中的主要合作模式。本文引入博弈模型比较了核心企业与配套企业之间进行协同创新和分别单独投资创新的情形。研究表明,协同创新比单独创新对市场更有利。协同创新可以使零部件和最终产品的价格更低,同时令产品的市场销量和两个企业的整体利润更高,但是却无法保证每个企业都能获得创新带来的利润增益。因此,必须对双方的创新利润分配方式进行规制调整,才能使双方企业公平合理地享有协同创新带来的利益,调动协同创新的积极性,为企业带来长期效益。The collaborative innovation between the core firm and its supporter become the most important cooperative relationship in cluster.To compare the different effect of collaborative and individual innovation,Stackelberg game is introduced into the model proposed in the paper.The results show that for markets,the collaborative innovation is better.It could bring lower price and more productivity for products.And though profits are increased for total,it does not mean the same for each of the companies if no adjustment is involved.So a new benefit adjustment is introduced into the model in order to make the allocation mechanism more reasonable and keep the collaboration going on.

关 键 词：核心企业 配套企业 协同创新 分配机制 产业集群 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F272