“绿色悖论”之谜:地方政府竞争视角的解读  

The Green Paradox Puzzle:Interpretation from the Perspective of Local Government Competition

作　　者：张华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第12期114-127,共14页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(11&ZD163);国家自然科学基金项目(71173218);江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划项目(KYZZ_0379)

摘　　要：文章利用中国2000—2011年省级面板数据,以地方政府竞争为切入点,基于地理邻接、地理距离和经济距离三种空间权重矩阵,构造动态空间面板模型检验了环境规制对碳排放的影响。研究显示:就纯粹的环境规制而言,本地区和相邻地区的环境规制能有效遏制碳排放,且环境规制的空间策略互动表现为"竞争向上"型;而在地方政府竞争的影响下,本地区和相邻地区的环境规制则显著促进了碳排放,引发环境规制竞争的"逐底效应"和"绿色悖论"现象。因此,为了有效规避"绿色悖论"现象,必须从匡正地方政府竞争行为入手,改革"中国式分权"下的激励机制,完善环境绩效考核制度与监督体系。By the panel data at provincial level in China from 2000 to 2011,this paper focuses on local government competition and constructs a dynamic spatial panel model to test the effect of environmental regulations on carbon emissions based on three spatial weights matrices of geographical adjacency,geographical distance and economic distance.It arrives at the conclusions as follows:in terms of pure environmental regulations,environmental regulations in local and neighboring regions effectively contain carbon emissions and the spatial strategy interaction of environmental regulations is characterized by'racing to the top';under the effect of local government competition,environmental regulations in local and neighboring regions effectively promote carbon emissions,leading to the racing?to-the-bottom effect of environmental regulations and the green paradox phenomenon.Therefore,in order to effectively avoid the green paradox phenomenon,China must correct the competition behavior of local governments,reform the existing incentives mechanism under Chinese style decentralization and improve the environmental performance evaluation and supervision systems.

关 键 词：环境规制 碳排放 地方政府竞争 动态空间面板模型 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F205[经济管理—国民经济]