外生集体声誉约束下中国认证产业的最优数量结构  

Optimal Number Structure of Certification Industry in China under Exogenous Collective Reputation Constraints

作　　者：陈艳莹[1] 鲍宗客[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第8期4-15,56,共13页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"嵌入性约束下的中介服务业市场结构演进与规制研究"(70603003);霍英东教育基金会资助项目"社会网络约束下的市场中介组织行为异化及其治理研究"(121081)

摘　　要：中国认证产业存在的最大特殊性在于行业存在制度性的外生集体声誉约束。此文尝试从认证产业的最优数量结构来探讨认证有效性问题,通过一个改进的双重不完全信息重复博弈模型,系统性地在外生集体声誉约束的框架下考察中国认证产业维持"质量卡特尔"的最优认证机构数量问题。我们的研究发现:首先,当认证机构注重未来的长远收益时,认证机构以其集体声誉作为一种可置信承诺,认证行业外生集体声誉的制度设计优于认证机构自设认证标准的个体声誉的制度设计;其次,在外生集体声誉约束下,分享集体声誉的最优认证机构数量是有限制的,最优认证机构数量与认证机构对未来的重视程度存在非线性的正相关关系,与虚假认证的收益存在非线性的负相关关系。因此,增加行业的信号传递效率和虚假认证的惩罚力度将是有效配合集体声誉约束事前机制的有效事后机制。The biggest particularity of certification industry in China lies in institutional exogenous collective reputation constraints.This paper tries to study the certification effectiveness from a perspective of optimal number structure of certification industry,and systematically explores the optimal number of certification institutions maintaining quality Cartel in Chinese certification industry under exogenous collective reputation constraints by an improved dual repeated game model with incomplete information.It comes to the following results:firstly,when certification institutions place emphasis on future long-term benefits,certification institutions take their collective reputation as credible commitment,and the design of exogenous collective reputation system is superior to the design of individual reputation system in certification industry;secondly,under exogenous collective reputation constraints,the optimal number of certification institutions sharing collective reputation is limited,which is non-linearly positively correlated with the importance certification institutions attach to the future and non-linearly negatively correlated with benefits of fake certification.Therefore,the increase in industry signaling efficiency and penalties for fake certification will be the effective ex-post mechanism coordinating the collective reputation constraint mechanism.

关 键 词：集体声誉 认证产业 重复博弈 不完全信息 

分 类 号：F203[经济管理—国民经济]