被征农地定价的讨价还价博弈与匹配机制研究  

On Bargaining Game and Matching Mechanism of Expropriated Cropland Pricing

作　　者：杨依山[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学文化与世界经济发展研究中心,山东济南250014 [2]山东大学历史文化学院,山东济南250010

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第7期27-42,共16页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划研究重点项目(09BJGJ29);山东省优秀中青年科学家科研奖励基金项目(BS1073510010);2012年度山东省博士后创新项目(201203080);中国博士后科学基金第53批面上资助项目(2013M531624)

摘　　要：中国农地改变用途后价值大幅提高,政府、企业和农民三个利益主体对增值进行利益博弈。被征农地应该如何定价,增值应该以什么比例分配给相关利益主体,研究者对此争议很大。文章把农地交易看成一个纯交换经济,探讨了三个利益主体之间的利益博弈。首先,找到不同条件下的讨价还价解,分析它们的关系及演化规律;然后,利用边际生产力贡献原理,分析均衡点的效率和公平兼顾的可能性;最后,利用稳定匹配理论探讨博弈双方实现以上均衡点的机制。研究表明:农地定价讨价还价博弈中任何个体的"理性"都会陷入囚徒困境,应该寻找一种定价机制和分配机制来实现个体理性、群体理性和整体理性的完美统一;所创造财富只有按照贡献份额公平分配,生产才有效率,但是由于现实与理论的差距,必须设计一些社会机制如农地网上交易平台以尽可能使现实接近理想。由此,文章在以上理论探讨的基础上,尝试设计出网上农地交易机制进行交易匹配,并针对农地交易中存在的现实问题给出相应的政策建议。The value of the cropland in China increases greatly after its use has changed.Governments,enterprises and farmers as three stakeholders conduct the value-added benefit game.The researchers have different opinions about how to make the price of expropriated cropland and allocate the value increments to relevant stakeholders.This paper regards the transaction of expropriated cropland as a pure exchange economy and studies the interest game between three stakeholders.Firstly,it finds out the bargaining solutions under different conditions,and analyzes their relationship and evolution rules;secondly,it uses the marginal productivity theory to analyze the possibility of the balance between efficiency and justice at the equilibrium point;finally,it employs the stable matching theory to study the mechanism of realizing the equilibrium point above-mentioned by game parties.It reaches the following conclusions:firstly,in the bargaining game of expropriated cropland pricing,any individual rationality could fall into the prisoner's dilemma,so pricing and allocation mechanism should be used to achieve the perfect unity of individual,group and whole rationality;secondly,created wealth is allocated fairly only in accordance with contribution shares,and the production has efficiency;but owing to the gap between reality and theory,some social mechanisms like online cropland trading platform should be designed in order to make reality close to ideal as far as possible.Therefore,based on the theoretical discussion above-mentioned,this paper tries to design online cropland trading mechanism and provides corresponding policy suggestions in view of actual problems of cropland transactions.

关 键 词：被征农地定价 讨价还价博弈 动态匹配机制 帕累托最优 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32